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Mike Lynch has now published several articles in several journals
condemning (typically under the guise of analysis) my role as an expert
witness for the defence in Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District,
where I claimed that intelligent design theory should be taught to high
school students in publicly supported schools in the United States.
His argument in each case–the latest being Lynch (2009)–consists in
drawn-out exercises of bafflement and outrage, which appear only to
increase as I continue to defend the proposition outside the courtroom.
I leave it to readers to speculate why he finds it necessary to reiterate this
position so much. My own–by my own lights charitable–opinion is that as
editor of the leading journal and now president of the leading association
in our field, he sees it as his professional duty to oppose what I have been
doing whenever he can. At least this would explain his outrage at my claim
that tenured academics in science studies are obliged to get involved in
public controversies where the nature of science is at stake (Fuller 2008).
Although he claims broad familiarity with my work, Lynch cannot fathom
the source of my deontological stance. It follows from my endorsement of
the principle of negative responsibility, which I have been long developing
as a normative response to Kuhn’s political quiescence during the Cold
War, most recently in Fuller (2009). People are negatively responsible for
actions in which their distinctive position would enable them to do much
good for others at relatively little cost to themselves. From this principle
it follows that tenured academics bear enormous negative responsibility
in society because their unique combination of intellectual credentials
and institutional security permits them to challenge established authorities
and command public attention in ways unavailable to others. Whatever
one thinks of their specific views, Noam Chomsky, Edward Said, and
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Richard Dawkins would count as exceptional instances of academics who
have used their tenured (or, in the case of Dawkins, tenure-like) status to
exercise negative responsibility.
But this doesn’t quite account for Lynch’s concern. While he is clearly
upset by my obliging tenured academics to become involved in public
controversies, his arguments are mostly about my apparent failure to
anticipate that the side I defended would lose. As a matter of fact, I always
knew that there was a strong chance that the defence would lose, but
given the protection afforded to me by tenure I calculated that the cost of
losing was not sufficient to deter me from professing in a courtroom what I
have been writing and talking about in academic settings for many years.
Anything less would be tantamount to not taking oneself seriously as an
academic (Corbyn 2006). When I accuse Michael Ruse or Robert Pennock
of being “traitors to their training,” I am saying that their easy support for the
scientific orthodoxy compromises what they should know about the history
and philosophy of science (Fuller 2008, 15). With that in mind, readers
can judge for themselves the probity of Pennock (2009), which presents
a “ballpark” definition of science that is philosophically accountable yet
sufficiently elastic for courtroom purposes.
In this respect, I find Lynch’s claim that I refuse to admit having made
a “mistake” very revealing (214). He doesn’t seem to mean “mistake”
in the sense I would gladly admit. Of course, I have made technical
errors, based on spontaneous statements generated for the occasion, and
indeed, sometimes based on ignorance–in which case I was prepared
to be educated in public. The errors here cover not only the courtroom
transcript–which, under a critical gaze, does neither side any favours–but
more importantly subsequent responses made on the internet, where
comments that would have been restricted to the common room twenty
years ago are now subject to public comment in cyberspace. The latter
is worth recalling when explaining the difference in response to the
participation of myself and Michael Ruse, a quarter-century earlier, in
similar trials. To this day, Lynch remains the most hostile critic in traditional
peer-reviewed forums, though his opinions are amply reinforced on the
internet.
However, the sort of “mistake” that Lynch would really like me to admit
is that my entire foray into the intelligent design controversy has been a
folly. To grasp Lynch’s point, perhaps I need to put myself in his shoes.
He is a noted micro-sociologist who may be inclined to judge efficacy in
terms of a relatively limited sense of “context” defined by the dominant
agents. It would follow that, as an expert witness, I was being invited to
play a particular position in a game whose rules I could not control. Under
the circumstances, I should have recognised it as a no-win situation and
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declined the offer. But standing in my own shoes, I am playing a much
longer game, in which short-term success is measured in terms of the
avoidance of complete disgrace (including job loss) and the promotion of
my own views about the nature of science, which I do not believe stray very
far from what science studies normally teaches. In that context, I undertake
a risky performance in the spirit of a living experiment, the results of
which should prove instructive not only to myself but also to others who
in the future are similarly well-positioned to bring science studies to bear
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